Prisoner\u27s Dilemma—Exhausted Without a Place of Rest(itution): Why the Prison Litigation Reform Act\u27s Exhaustion Requirement Needs to Be Amended by Lefkowitz, Ryan
The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race 
and Social Justice 
Volume 20 Number 2 Article 2 
5-2018 
Prisoner's Dilemma—Exhausted Without a Place of Rest(itution): 
Why the Prison Litigation Reform Act's Exhaustion Requirement 
Needs to Be Amended 
Ryan Lefkowitz 
Syracuse University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar 
 Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, 
Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Cultural Heritage Law 
Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Law and Gender Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law 
and Race Commons, Law and Society Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, Legal 
History Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, Legislation Commons, National Security Law Commons, 
State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
20 Scholar 189 (2018). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St. 
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social 







EXHAUSTED WITHOUT A PLACE OF REST(ITUTION): 
WHY THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT’S 
EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT NEEDS TO BE AMENDED 
RYAN LEFKOWITZ∗ 
 
  I.  Introduction ............................................................................... 191 
 II.  The Legislative History and Intent of the PLRA ...................... 193 
III.  The PLRA as Interpreted by the Supreme Court ...................... 197 
A. Interpretation of “Prison Conditions” and Applicability 
to Excessive Force Claims ................................................. 197 
B. “Exhausted”: What This Term Really Means .................... 201 
C. Exception to Exhaustion: Unavailability ............................ 205 
D. The Rules Applied .............................................................. 208 
IV.  Endemic Racism in the Prison Setting: Why the Exhaustion 
Requirement Should Be Amended ............................................ 210 
A. A Possible Solution ............................................................ 212 
V.  Conclusion ................................................................................. 214 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate, Syracuse University College of Law 2018; B.A. English, State University 
of New York at Geneseo. The author thanks her family—Elizabeth Ryan, Arnold Lefkowitz, 
Madelon Finkel, and Steven Kraft—for their support and for inspiring her to always strive for more. 
She also thanks her friends for being there for the late nights and long phone calls that got her 
through the trials of law school. In addition, the author thanks the members of The Scholar for their 
dedication and hard work in preparing this Note for publication.   
1
Lefkowitz: Prison Litigation Reform Act's Exhaustion Requirement
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018
  
190 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 20:189 
ABSTRACT 
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) passed in 1996 in an effort 
to curb litigation from prisoners.  The exhaustion requirement of the 
PLRA requires prisoners to fully exhaust any administrative remedies 
available to them before filing a lawsuit concerning any aspect of prison 
life.  If a prisoner fails to do so, the lawsuit is subject to dismissal.  The 
exhaustion requirement applies to all types of prisoner lawsuits, from 
claims filed for general prison conditions to excessive force and civil 
rights violations.  It has been consistently and aggressively applied by the 
courts, blocking prisoners’ lawsuits from ever going to trial.  Attempts to 
exempt prisoners from its reach to allow unexhausted, yet meritorious 
claims have been struck down by the Supreme Court of the United States.    
The exhaustion requirement mandates the use of an inmate grievance 
procedure, most of which create time limits for the filing of a complaint. 
Therefore, many of the suits dismissed for a failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies cannot be subsequently exhausted.  Even where 
lawsuits are dismissed without prejudice for a failure to exhaust, the 
expiration of an inmate’s ability to exhaust acts as a bar on his or her 
lawsuit.  
The PLRA also disproportionately affects black and Hispanic citizens; 
these minority groups comprise the majority of incarcerated individuals.  
In a society currently seeing increasing numbers of excessive force claims 
brought by black citizens against police officers, the PLRA creates a 
substantial obstacle for black and Hispanic inmates to bring similar 
claims against corrections officers, nurses, or anyone involved in life in 
the prison setting. 
Due to its aggressive application and its subsequent restriction on 
access to the courts, the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA should be 
amended.  Instead of applying a strict exhaustion requirement, the PLRA 
should only require a good faith attempt at exhaustion.  Additionally, the 
good faith attempt at exhaustion should only be a requirement where a 
prison’s grievance procedure complies with federal guidelines.  This 
would address the issues the PLRA intended; managing increasing 
prisoner litigation, giving prisons notice of unfavorable conditions, and 
preventing meritorious claims that were not exhausted from being barred 
as a result of missing a deadline. 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
“Take this, ni**er.”1  Those were the words preceding a brutal attack 
and sexual assault on 30-year-old Abner Louima.2  A brawl at a club led 
to a police officer being punched in the head where Louima was 
mistakenly identified as the assailant.3  Louima was arrested on multiple 
charges and taken to a police station in Brooklyn.4  While being 
transported in a patrol car, he was beaten and had racial epithets hurled at 
him.5  This was only the beginning.  At the station house, Louima was 
taken into the bathroom, held down, and sodomized with a plunger before 
having the handle brutally forced into his mouth.6  Louima would 
eventually endure emergency surgery to repair a tear in his small intestine 
and an injury to his bladder before being placed on critical condition 
status in the hospital.7  His attacker, officer Justin Volpe, was sentenced 
to thirty years in prison, with the sentencing judge remarking “[s]hort of 
intentional murder, one cannot imagine a more barbarous misuse of 
power . . .”8  Louima later brought a civil suit against Volpe alleging 
excessive force that settled for $7,125,000.9 
No such civil suit was available for Erick Marshel, an inmate of the 
New York State prison system, when he alleged two corrections officers 
stripped him, beat him, and berated him with “such words as ni**er [and] 
Coon []” before parading his naked, bruised body in front of other 
 
1. Maria Hinojosa, NYC Officer Arrested in Alleged Sexual Attack on Suspect, CNN (Aug. 
14, 1997, 4:29 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/US/9708/14/police.torture/ [https://perma.cc/VY9B-
G2HA]. 
2. Id. 






8. Joseph P. Fried, Volpe Sentenced to a 30-Year Term in Louima Torture, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
14, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/14/nyregion/volpe-sentenced-to-a-30-year-term-in-
louima-torture.html [https://nyti.ms/2yDZUnD] (quoting Federal Judge Eugene H. Nickerson).  
9. Third Supplemental Summons in a Civil Action & Third Amended Complaint & Jury 
Demand at 28, Louima v. City of N.Y., 2004 WL 2359943 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2000) (No. 98 CV 
5083(SJ)), http://www.chambercoalition.org/Abner%20Louima%20Complaint.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/7R6X-7GWV]; Alan Feuer & Jim Dwyer, City Settles Suit in Louima Torture, N.Y. TIMES (July 
13, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/13/nyregion/city-settles-suit-in-louima-torture.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2thuDaw].  
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inmates.10  On November 3, 1998, Marshel brought legal action against 
his attackers.11  He filed an amended complaint on April 19, 1999, and 
on July 6, 1999, he filed a response to defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.12  
Ultimately, these claims were dismissed based on a procedural 
technicality: failure to exhaust, as mandated by the PLRA.13  
The PLRA was enacted to curb what was seen as “an alarming 
explosion in the number of lawsuits filed by state and federal 
prisoners.”14  One way this was accomplished was through the creation 
of an “exhaustion requirement,” which prohibited prisoners from 
bringing legal action concerning prison conditions without first 
exhausting all available administrative remedies.15  This exhaustion 
requirement compelled prisoners to utilize inmate grievance programs, 
which vary by state but typically involve filing a grievance before 
proceeding through several more steps, including an appeal.16  Once a 
prisoner has completed all the administrative steps outlined by their state 
or federal prison facility, they have exhausted their remedies.17  If a 
prisoner filed a suit in court prior to fully exhausting such remedies, the 
case would be dismissed—as was the case for Marshel.18  In a country 
where the majority of inmates are black and Hispanic males,19 and 
 
10. See Marshel v. Westchester Cty., No. 98 CIV.7852(MBM), 1999 WL 1256252, at *1 
n.4, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 1999) (dismissing Marshel’s suit for excessive force and abuse). 
11. Id. at *2. 
12. Id. at *2. 
13. Id. at *3. 
14. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104–134 § 7, 110 Stat. 1321–66, 71–73 
(1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012)); 141 CONG. REC. 14570 (1995) 
(statement of Sen. Dole). 
15. 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a) (2012). 
16. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (describing the grievance process 
implemented by the California Department of Corrections). 
17. See id. at 92–93 (contrasting administrative remedies from state habeas remedies, as the 
latter is described as “having been ‘exhausted’ when they are no longer available, regardless of the 
reason for their unavailability”).  
18. See id. at 93 (stating that even if the prisoner procedurally defaulted in exhausting their 
administrative remedies, “the prisoner is generally barred from asserting those claims in a federal 
habeas proceeding.”); Marshel v. Westchester Cty., No. 98 CIV.7852(MBM), 1999 WL 1256252, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 1999) (stating “ . . . it is uncontroverted that Marshel has not exhausted 
his administrative remedies as he must before bringing an action in this court.”). 
19. See ANN E. CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISONERS IN 2014 at 15 (Lynne McConnell & Jill Thomas eds., 2015) 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LEZ-P6QX] (showing 2.7% of 
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racialized violence against prisoners is so commonplace as to warrant 
investigations,20 a restraint on the filing of civil rights actions is statutory 
support of institutionalized racism.  
Part I of this Note will introduce the PLRA and its legislative intent, 
including the flawed premise under which it was passed.  Part II will look 
at how the Supreme Court of the United States has strictly applied the 
exhaustion requirement of the PLRA, further infringing on a prisoner’s 
access to the court system.  Part III will look at racial violence and 
discrimination in the prison system, including how these issues 
necessitate amending the PLRA to ensure equal access to the courts.  This 
proposed amendment balances a prisoner’s access to the courts with the 
original goals of the PLRA. 
II.    THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTENT OF THE PLRA 
On May 25, 1995, Senator Bob Dole introduced the PLRA of 1995 into 
the United States Senate.21  Dole argued the legislation would curb the 
number of lawsuits filed by prisoners.22  In support, Senator Dole cited 
a study by Walter Berns indicating “the number of ‘due-process and cruel 
and unusual punishment’ complaints filed by prisoners” as having 
“grown astronomically—from 6,600 in 1975 to more than 39,000 in 
1994.”23  With a quick mention of the act also requiring “[s]tate prisoners 
to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit in [f]ederal 
court,” Dole understatedly introduced the PLRA’s “Exhaustion 
Requirement.”24  
 
black males and 1.1% of Hispanic males incarcerated were serving sentences of at least 1 year 
compared to 0.5% of white males). 
20. E.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., 2015 SPECIAL REVIEW: HIGH DESERT STATE 
PRISON SUSANVILLE, CA at 11-12 (2015), http://www.oig.ca.gov/media/reports/Reports/ 
Reviews/2015_Special_Review_-_High_Desert_State_Prison.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA7B-3KQF] 
[hereinafter HIGH DESERT].  During a review of officer-inmate interactions in a California prison, 
researchers interviewed former inmates regarding several different factors.  On the issue of race, 
several minority inmates reported incidents of racially derogatory statements made by officers, 
kicking of black inmates, and placing black and Hispanic inmates in longer lockdowns.  Id. at 11–
12 . 
21. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104–134 § 7, 110 Stat. 1321–66, 71–73 
(1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012)); 141 CONG. REC. 14570–574 (1995) 
(statement of Sen. Dole). 
22. 141 CONG. REC. 14570 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole). 
23. Id.  
24. Id. at 14571.  
5
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In support of his assertion on the frivolity of most prisoners’ lawsuits, 
Dole claimed “prisoners have filed lawsuits claiming such grievances as 
insufficient storage locker space, being prohibited from attending a 
wedding anniversary party, and yes, being served creamy peanut butter 
instead of the chunky variety they had ordered.”25  Dole argued such 
lawsuits significantly burden the court systems as they “tie up the courts, 
waste valuable judicial and legal resources, and affect the quality of 
justice enjoyed by the law-abiding population.”26  
Dole cited two statistics in support of his argument that prison 
litigation had substantially increased in recent years.27  He referenced a 
finding by Arizona Attorney General Grant Woods stating “45 percent of 
the civil cases filed in Arizona’s Federal courts last year were filed by 
State prisoners.”28  Dole concluded this number meant “that 20,000 
prisoners in Arizona filed almost as many cases as Arizona’s 3.5 million 
law-abiding citizens.”29  This conclusion  was erroneous. The Attorney 
General’s statistic specifically mentioned “civil cases filed in Arizona’s 
Federal courts,” and therefore what the initial number reflected was that 
20,000 prisoners in Arizona filed almost as many cases in federal court 
as Arizona’s 3.5 million citizens.30  This statistic makes sense when one 
considers many civil lawsuits from prisoners involve civil claims under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and end up in federal court.31  This exercise of Article 
III jurisdiction is at odds with suits filed by private citizens, which 
typically include legal claims implicating state law and remain out of 
federal court. 
Dole’s second argument cited the increase in the gross number of 
lawsuits filed by prisoners as evidence of a substantial uptick in the 
amount of prisoner litigation filed.32 Dole represented this increase from 
 
25. Id. at 14570.  
26. Id. at 14571.  
27. Id. at 14570–571.  
28. Id. at 14571. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. (emphasis added)  
31. See U.S. DIST. COURT, DIST. OF MINN., PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS FEDERAL LITIGATION 
GUIDEBOOK 3 (2015), http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/Pro-Se/PrisonerCivilRightsLitigGuide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L52S-5BJL] (providing a guide to navigate through a prisoner civil rights federal 
litigation case).  
32. 141 CONG. REC. 14570 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole). 
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“6,600 in 1975” to “39,000 in 1994.”33  These statistics illustrate Dole’s 
premise in advocating for the PLRA: to curb what was seen as a huge 
problem clogging the court system.34 
This premise is erroneous.  First, the rate of filing should be 
considered, not the number of lawsuits filed.35  Dole’s statistics fail to 
take into account the sharp increase in the prison population itself 
between 1975 and 1994.36  In 1975, the total prison inmate population in 
the United States was 253,816.37  By 1994, the number of inmates had 
risen to 1,053,738.38  This means that between 1975 and 1994, the inmate 
population quadrupled.39  Accordingly, the total number of lawsuits filed 
by inmates increased.  
The actual rate at which inmates filed civil rights complaints in federal 
court reached an all-time high in 1981 with 29.3 complaints filed per 
1,000 inmates.40  By the time the PLRA was introduced in 1994, the rate 
had dropped to 23.2 complaints per 1,000 inmates.41  The enactment of 
the PLRA was a reaction to increased incarceration in the United States, 
not increased rates at which prisoners filed lawsuits.42  
 
33. Id. 
34. See id. at 14571 (suggesting lawsuits filed by prisoners were an encumbrance on judicial 
resources, stating “time and money spent defending most of these cases are clearly time and money 
that could be better spent prosecuting criminals, fighting illegal drugs, or cracking down on 
consumer fraud”). 
35. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1578-87 (2003). 
36. See id. at 1578–87 (“[A]fter 1981, annual increases in inmate federal civil rights filings 
were primarily associated, in nearly every state, with the growing incarcerated population[.]”); see 
also WILFRED J. DIXON & FRANK J. MASSEY, JR., INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 3 
(1st ed. 1951) (providing examples of common issues in statistical analysis including variability 
and correlation). 
37. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS 1925–81, at 3 
(1982), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p2581.pdf [https://perma.cc/3922-QJKB] 
[hereinafter JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1981]. 
38. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 1994, at 1 
(1995), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/Pi94.pdf [https://perma.cc/K94F-DPT5] [hereinafter 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1994]. 
39. Compare JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1981, supra note 37, at 3 (evidencing the total U.S. 
prisoner population as 253,816 in 1975), with JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1994, supra note 38, at 1 (1995), 
(evidencing the total U.S. prison population as 1,053,738 in 1994). 
40. See Schlanger, supra note 35, at 1578–87 (“[A]bsolute filing numbers alone are helpful 
only if the issue is litigation processing, not litigation rates.”). 
41. Id. at 1583. 
42. See David Fathi, No Equal Justice: The Prison Litigation Reform Act in the United 
States, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, June 16, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/06/16/no-equal-
7
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This sharp increase in United States incarcerations was a result of 
President Reagan’s massive expansion of the War on Drugs.43  This new 
aggressiveness in drug enforcement resulted in over 400,000 nonviolent 
drug offenders being imprisoned by 1997.44  The War on Drugs not only 
contributed to overall high incarceration rates, but also to the increasing 
disparity between the racial make-up of the United States prison 
population.45  During the 1980s, federal penalties for crack cocaine were 
exorbitantly harsher than those for powder cocaine, an inconsistency that 
disproportionately sentenced black offenders to much lengthier prison 
sentences than white offenders.46  As Michelle Alexander noted in her 
book The New Jim Crow, “[n]othing has contributed more to the 
systematic mass incarceration of people of color in the United States than 
the War on Drugs.”47 
By instituting racially charged and draconian drug laws, federal 
sentencing schemes incarcerated African-Americans  at a higher rate and 
for longer durations.48  Additionally, the War on Drugs contributed to 
over-population and over-crowding in prisons across the United States.49  
Yet instead of addressing these issues and the subsequent increase in 
litigation they caused, the PLRA was passed to simply cut off the filing 
 
justice/prison-litigation-reform-act-united-states [https://perma.cc/9D82-GA7L] (stating that 
between 1995 and 1997, federal civil rights filings fell by 33% despite the 10% increase of 
incarcerated persons). 
43. A Brief History of the Drug War, DRUG POLICY, http://www.drugpolicy.org/facts/new-
solutions-drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war-0 [https://perma.cc/PAZ3-CR9H] [hereinafter A 
Brief History] (last visited Dec. 18, 2017). See also Remarks Announcing Federal Initiatives 
Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1313–17 (Oct. 14, 1982). 
44. A Brief History, supra note 43. 
45. Race and the Drug War, DRUG POLICY, http://www.drugpolicy.org/race-and-drug-war 
[https://perma.cc/9KFW-AN37] (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).  
46. Id.   
47. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 60 (2012). 
48. See Jonathan Rothwell, Drug Offenders in American Prisons: The Critical Distinction 
Between Stock and Flow BROOKINGS (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-
mobility-memos/2015/11/25/drug-offenders-in-american-prisons-the-critical-distinction-between-
stock-and-flow [https://perma.cc/VG7Y-ADVN] (reporting African-Americans are 3 to 4 times 
more likely to be incarcerated for drug crimes even though they are no more likely to use or sell 
drugs than whites).   
49. Pamela Engel, Watch How Quickly The War on Drugs Changed America’s Prison 
Population, BUSINESS INSIDER (April 23. 2014, 1:19 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-
the-war-on-drugs-changed-americas-prison-population-2014-4 [https://perma.cc/7RUK-HJLJ]. 
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of lawsuits.50  In other words, it addressed a symptom of a systemic 
problem, not the source.51  
III.    THE PLRA AS INTERPRETED BY THE SUPREME COURT  
When the PLRA was enacted in 1996, the language of its exhaustion 
requirement was fairly innocuous on its face.52  It read that “[n]o action 
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions . . . or any other Federal 
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional 
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted.”53  Facially, it read like any other exhaustion requirement 
common to administrative law prohibiting judicial review prior to 
appealing a decision from an administrative body.54  Almost 
immediately, courts began questioning the applicability of the exhaustion 
requirement,55 and the Supreme Court’s interpretations turned a statute 
already restricting access to the courts into a greater obstacle for prisoners 
to overcome.56  
A. Interpretation of “Prison Conditions” and Applicability to 
Excessive Force Claims 
Confusion emerged over what constituted “prison conditions” and 
whether the term included excessive use of physical force claims brought 
 
50. Joseph T. Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Three Strikes and You’re out of 
Court – It May Be Effective, but Is It Constitutional?, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 497 (1997). 
51. Schlanger, supra note 35, at 1694 (highlighting PLRA reduced overall litigation by 
making it uneconomical for inmates to pursue low-stake cases even when such cases are high in 
merit). 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). 
53. Id. 
54. Clive Lewis, The Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies in Administrative Law, 51 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 138, 139 (1992). 
55. Compare Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding the term 
“prison conditions” as used in the statute included excessive force claims), with Lawrence v. Goord, 
238 F.3d 182, 185 (2nd Cir. 2001) (holding that particularized instances of retaliatory conduct, like 
particularized instances of force, are not subject to the PLRA’s administrative exhaustion 
requirements).  
56. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (holding that even though the prison 
grievance procedure did not provide for requested monetary relief, an inmate was nonetheless 
required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit with respect to prison conditions); 
see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 519 (2002) (holding that the exhaustion requirement 
applied to all prisoners seeking redress for prison conditions or occurrences, regardless of whether 
the claim involved general circumstances or a particular episode). 
9
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under the Eighth Amendment.57  If such claims were not included by the 
broad phrasing of “prison conditions,” then exhaustion of administrative 
remedies would not be required prior to filing.58  The Second Circuit 
addressed this issue in Nussle v. Willette.59  Appellant Ronald Nussle 
claimed a corrections officer assaulted him while he was in the custody 
of the Connecticut Department of Corrections.60  Nussle alleged he was 
the victim of a continued pattern of “harassment and intimidation,” 
including an incident where two corrections officers “entered his cell, 
instructed him to leave the cell, and proceeded to beat him without 
apparent provocation or justification of any sort.”61  They continued to 
attack him, beating him so badly “he lost control of his bowels.”62  
Nussle alleged “the officers threatened to kill him if he reported the 
beating.”63  Nussle filed suit in district court without first filing a 
grievance with the prison or utilizing any administrative remedies.64  He 
brought his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the officers violated 
“his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishment.”65  The suit was dismissed due to his failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies.66 
Nussle appealed to the Second Circuit, which addressed the issue of 
“whether the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), encompasses claims for excessive use of physical 
force under the Eighth Amendment.”67  The Second Circuit began their 
analysis by noting that as a general matter, exhaustion is not required for 
§ 1983 claims and that the legislative intent of § 1983 supports “this 
presumptive rule of non-exhaustion.”68 
The “very purpose” of § 1983 claims was “to interpose the federal 
courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s 
 
57. Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 99–100 (2d. Cir. 2000) rev’d, 534 U.S. 516 (2002). 
58. Id. at 100; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2013). 
59. 224 F.3d 95, 96–97 (2d. Cir. 2000) rev’d, 534 U.S. 516 (2002). 
60. Id. at 97. 
61. Id. 






68. Id. at 97–98. 
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federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action under 
color of state law, ‘whether that action be executive, legislative, or 
judicial.’”69  However, the court noted the PLRA created a specific 
exhaustion requirement in this case, and therefore, “if claims for 
particular instances of assault or excessive force are properly considered 
claims ‘brought with respect to prison conditions,’ then Nussle 
must . . . exhaust ‘such administrative remedies as are available’ before 
taking his federal claims to court.”70  
The Second Circuit recognized other circuits had previously found the 
exhaustion requirement to apply in such circumstances.71  The court 
turned to an analysis of the language of the PLRA and concluded “the use 
of the term ‘prison conditions’ in § 1997e(a) would appear to refer to 
‘circumstances affecting everyone in the area affected by them,’ rather 
than ‘single or momentary matter[s],’ such as beatings or assaults, that 
are directed at particular individuals.”72  Additionally, the court looked 
to the Supreme Court’s own handling of prisoner suits and found that the 
“[p]re-PLRA Supreme Court decisions disaggregate the broad category 
of Eighth Amendment claims so as to distinguish between ‘excessive 
force’ claims, on the one hand, and ‘conditions of confinement’ claims, 
on the other.”73  Therefore, the Second Circuit held there was a distinct 
difference “between ‘excessive force’ and ‘prison conditions’ claims for 
purposes of exhaustion under § 1997e(a) and conclude[d] that exhaustion 
of administrative remedies is not required for claims of assault or 
excessive force brought under § 1983.”74 
Nussle’s victory was short lived.75  The Second Circuit’s decision was 
appealed, and in an effort to resolve the circuit split, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.76  They reversed the Second Circuit’s holding and 
 
69. See id. (citing Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)); see also Patsy v. Bd. of 
Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982) (noting the precursor to §1983 was first enacted during 
Reconstruction when the Federal Government established itself as a guarantor of basic federal 
rights against intrusions of state power). 
70. Nussle, 224 F.3d at 100. 
71. Id.; see also Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 293–98 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding excessive 
force claims are actions “brought with respect to prison conditions” under § 1997e(a)). 
72. Nussle, 224 F.3d at 101. 
73. Id. at 106. 
74. Id. 
75. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 
76. Id. 
11
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found “the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits 
about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or 
particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some 
other wrong.”77  The Court elaborated they had previously separated 
suits about incarceration into two categories: “those challenging the fact 
or duration of confinement itself” and “those challenging the conditions 
of confinement.”78  The Court noted “the latter category unambiguously 
embraced the kind of single episode cases that petitioner’s construction 
would exclude.”79  Contrary to the Second Circuit’s argument, it further 
found the use of the phrase “prison conditions” could be intended to make 
clear pre-incarceration claims fell outside of § 1997e(a), and not to 
separate out single incidents that occur while incarcerated.80  Otherwise, 
a prisoner who had been assaulted would not have to exhaust, whereas a 
prisoner who was systematically beaten and abused would have to.81  
Porter v. Nussle established that brutality and violence against 
prisoners by corrections officers is, legally, a “prison condition.”82  It 
allowed no exception from the exhaustion requirement for instances of 
excessive force stemming from corrections officers or prison 
employees.83  This burden firmly restricted a prisoner’s access to civil 
remedies in cases of excessive force.84  It seems the way to avoid these 
issues would be for inmates to fully exhaust before filing lawsuits, yet 
 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 527 (citing McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141 (1991)); see also, Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 505 (1973) (“[A] prisoner may challenge the conditions of his 
confinement by petition for writ of habeas corpus, . . . provided he attacks only the conditions of 
his confinement and not its fact or duration.”). 
79. Porter, 534 U.S. at 527 (citing McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141 (1991)). 
80. Id. at 529. 
81. See id. at 531 (discussing the “circumstance dichotomy” that exists within the Second 
Circuit’s belief).  
82. See id. at 528 (citing to the decisions of McCarthy and Preiser that “tug strongly away 
from classifying suits about prison guards’ use of excessive force, one or many times, as anything 
other than actions ‘with respect to prison conditions’”).  
83. See id. at 524 (explaining “exhaustion is now required for all ‘actions … brought with 
respect to prison conditions,’ whether under §1983 or ‘any other Federal law’”). 
84. See id. (quoting a provision of §1983 that mandates “all available ‘remedies’ must . . . be 
exhausted; those remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and 
effective’”). 
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Supreme Court precedent set a high bar in determining what constituted 
“exhaust[ion].”85  
B. “Exhausted”: What This Term Really Means 
Omitted from the plain language of the PLRA was a definition for 
“exhausted.”86   Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Woodford v. 
Ngo, there was a circuit split concerning “whether a prisoner can satisfy 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement . . . by filing 
an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance 
or appeal.”87  The Sixth Circuit previously found untimely grievances 
counted as exhaustion of remedies as they still served both “Congress’s 
purpose in passing the PLRA and Supreme Court precedent regarding the 
exhaustion doctrine’s oft-stated purpose: to give prison officials the first 
opportunity to address inmate complaints.”88  Other courts, such as the 
Seventh and Tenth Circuits, were more strict and “interpreted the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement as requiring a timely grievance by a prisoner at 
the administrative level before the prisoner initiates a federal cause of 
action.”89 
The Supreme Court resolved this circuit split in Woodford v. Ngo.90 
Ngo filed a grievance concerning restricted access to religious activities 
against the California prison system.91  Ngo’s grievance, however, was 
time-barred because it was filed six months after the restriction 
commenced, rather than within fifteen days of the alleged occurrence in 
accordance with prison policy.92  Ngo appealed that decision, but was 
unsuccessful; he ultimately resorted to filing a lawsuit in federal district 
 
85. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (discussing the specifics of mandatory 
exhaustion for administrative remedies, including utilizing procedures the agency “holds out, and 
doing so properly” such that the merits are addressed). 
86. See id. at 93 (inferring “exhausted” has the same meaning as it does in administrative 
law, given the PLRA’s reference to “such administrative remedies as are available”). 
87. Id. at 83–84. 
88. Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that “so long as an 
inmate presents his or her grievance to prison officials and appeals through the available 
procedures, the inmate has exhausted his or her administrative remedies, and a prison’s decision 
not to address the grievance because it was untimely under prison rules shall not bar the federal 
suit.”). 
89. Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 626–27 (9th Cir. 2005). 
90. 548 U.S. 81 (2006). 
91. Id. at 86–87. 
92. Id. at 87. 
13
Lefkowitz: Prison Litigation Reform Act's Exhaustion Requirement
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018
  
202 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 20:189 
court.93  The district court granted a motion to dismiss for failure to 
exhaust based on the initial untimely grievance.94  The Ninth Circuit 
reversed, holding  “Ngo exhausted all administrative remedies available 
to him as required by the PLRA when he completed all avenues of 
administrative review available to him: [h]is administrative appeal was 
deemed time-barred and no further level of appeal remained in the state 
prison’s internal appeals process.”95 
The Supreme Court analyzed the theory of exhaustion and found that 
“[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines 
and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can 
function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the 
course of its proceedings.”96  The question then became whether the 
totality of “proper exhaustion” was required.97  In looking to the statute, 
the Court found that “requiring proper exhaustion serves the purposes of 
the PLRA.”98  To construe otherwise would render the PLRA “a 
toothless scheme[,]” as prisoners could simply wait until their grievances 
were time-barred, and then proceed directly to federal court if it was 
rejected as untimely.99  For these reasons, the Court held total exhaustion 
and compliance with internal procedures and deadlines was required prior 
to bringing prisoners’ lawsuits.100  
The Woodford decision was not unanimous.  Justice Stevens, joined by 
Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg, dissented.101  The dissent noted 
“[t]he citizen’s right to access an impartial tribunal to seek redress for 
official grievances is so fundamental and so well established that it is 
sometimes taken for granted.”102  The dissent challenged the factual 




95. Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 631 (9th Cir. 2005).  
96. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2006).  
97. Id. at 95. 
98. Id. at 93–95. 
99. Id. at 95. 
100. See id. at 93 (alteration in original) (“The [Prison Litigation Reform Act] attempts to 
eliminate unwarranted federal-court interference with the administration of prisons, and thus seeks 
to ‘affor[d] corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before 
allowing the initiation of a federal case.’”). 
101. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 104 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
102. Id. 
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very idea that Ngo’s grievance was untimely.103  Stevens’s dissent 
emphasized Ngo “filed a second grievance after his first grievance was 
rejected, arguing that his first grievance was in fact timely because he 
was challenging petitioners’ continuing prohibition on his capacity to 
participate in Catholic observances, such as Confession, Holy Week 
services, and Bible study.”104  
Second, the dissent pointed out that a statute  limiting a private citizen 
to a fifteen day window  to file a lawsuit in federal court would certainly 
be unenforceable.105    Justice Stevens summarized the issue as whether 
“Congress intended to authorize state correction officials to impose a 
comparable limitation on prisoners’ constitutionally protected right of 
access to the federal courts.”106  To this question, the dissent resolutely 
felt “the correct interpretation of the statute would recognize that, in 
enacting the PLRA, [m]embers of Congress created a rational regime 
designed to reduce the quantity of frivolous prison litigation while 
adhering to their constitutional duty ‘to respect the dignity of all persons,’ 
even ‘those convicted of heinous crimes.’”107  The dissent further asked 
whether “a 48-hour limitations period [would] furnish a meaningful 
opportunity for a prisoner to raise meritorious grievances in the context 
of a juvenile who has been raped and repeatedly assaulted, with the 
knowledge and assistance of guards, while in detention?”108  Scenarios 
such as this could raise very real constitutional challenges to the 
exhaustion requirement itself due to the majority’s adoption of a total 
exhaustion requirement.109  And yet, complying with such 
constitutionally questionable procedures mired by internal time-sensitive 
constraints is precisely what “proper exhaustion” requires. 
 
103. Id. at 120–21 (asserting the prison’s denial of an opportunity to engage in religious 
activity was ongoing, and therefore, the grievance was timely within prison’s 15-day statute of 
limitations). 
104. Id. at 121. 
105. Id. at 104. 
106. Id. 
107. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
108. Id. at 121. 
109. See id. at 122 (suggesting such strict enforcement of exhaustion conflicts with the 
notion that “the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition 
the Government for redress of grievances.” (quoting Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 
U.S. 731, 741 (1983))).  
15
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The majority’s fear that allowing untimely grievances to count as 
exhaustion would enable prisoners to circumvent the grievance process 
fails to account for the difficulty of navigating a prison grievance system.  
Each prison can set its own internal procedures and deadlines, including 
what steps are required to fully exhaust administrative remedies.   
For example, in New York, there are three levels of review an inmate 
must go through before fully exhausting all remedies.110  First, an inmate 
must file a grievance within twenty-one days of the alleged incident.111  
Once an inmate receives a written response from the Inmate Grievance 
Resolution Committee (IGRC), the inmate has seven days to file an 
appeal to the superintendent.112  After  the inmate receives a decision 
from the superintendent, he or she must then file an appeal to the Central 
Office Review Committee (CORC)113 within seven days.  The inmate 
must receive a final decision from CORC before he or she is able to file 
suit in court without fear of dismissal for failure to exhaust.114  If a 
prisoner files while waiting on a final decision, the suit will be subject to 
dismissal.115  
New York is only one of several state inmate grievance systems.  In 
light of Ngo, a prisoner who accidentally files a grievance or appeal, even 
one day late, during any step in any of the state grievance systems might 
be permanently barred from bringing a lawsuit.116  Roughly six months 
after deciding Ngo, the Supreme Court considered whether a lawsuit 
containing a mix of exhausted and unexhausted claims could proceed.  In 
Jones v. Bock, the Court rejected a rule that would require judges “to 
dismiss the entire action if the prisoner fails to satisfy the exhaustion 
requirement as to any single claim in his complaint.”117  On its face, such 
a holding seemed to protect prisoners from having the entirety of their 
suit thrown out if they failed to exhaust some claims, but fully exhausted 
 





115. See generally Woodford, 548 U.S. at 81 (holding “proper exhaustion” is required in 
that prisoners must fully exhaust all available administrative remedies under the PLRA). 
116. Id. 
117. 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007).   
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others.118  However, the holding should have been extended to allow all 
claims to proceed as long as some in the suit were exhausted. Instead, 
application of the Jones decision potentially dismisses a prisoner’s 
lawsuit if such lawsuit is broader in scope than the original grievance.119  
Omitting even part of an incident when filling out a grievance could lead 
to dismissal for that part of a prisoner’s lawsuit.  Again, the rationale 
behind this rule was based on the idea that prisoners would deliberately 
avoid exhaustion and gave little thought to the number of claims that may 
be barred simply because a prisoner failed to mention part of an 
altercation in their original grievance.  
For a statute  created to ease judicial burdens, and that has been so 
aggressively applied by the Supreme Court, circuit courts instead have 
strained to aid prisoners by carving out exceptions to the PLRA where 
they can.120  A mandatory requirement of total exhaustion eliminates any 
space for the judiciary to exercise discretion and review meritorious 
claims which may not be completely exhausted.  The PLRA should be 
amended to require only a good faith attempt at exhaustion, not the 
“proper exhaustion” standard held by the Supreme Court.  Despite the 
need, attempts by the circuits to carve out exemptions allowing such 
claims through have been struck down by the Supreme Court.   
C. Exception to Exhaustion: Unavailability 
Amending the PLRA statute to require only a good faith attempt at 
exhausting administrative remedies would allow courts to exercise more 
discretion without forcing judicially created exceptions to the PLRA.  
One existing statutory  exception to the exhaustion requirement is in the 
text itself: part (a) of Section 1997e requires exhaustion of 
“administrative remedies as are available.”121  This language left the  
 
118. See Abdul-Muhammad v. Kempker,486 F.3d 444, 446 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversing a 
previous decision dismissing an inmate’s entire grievance claim for failure to exhaust all available 
remedies for each discrete claim following the Supreme Court’s Jones decision). The remand order 
in Abdul-Muhammad instructed the District court to determine which of the prisoner’s claims had 
been properly exhausted. Id.  
119. Jones, 549 U.S. at 203. 
120. Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 273 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that “if the judge 
determines that the plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies or that his or her failure to 
exhaust should be excused, the case may proceed to the merits.”). 
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013). 
17
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determination of what constitutes an available remedy to the courts.122  
The Second Circuit interpreted “available” narrowly, and carved out 
“special circumstances” under which failing to comply with 
administrative procedures for various reasons was excusable.123  Such 
special circumstances might include lack of clarity in a grievance 
procedure124 or a fear of retaliation.125  
This approach was later adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Blake v. Ross, 
which noted “the exhaustion requirement is not absolute.” 126  The 
Fourth Circuit further concluded “[t]here are certain ‘special 
circumstances’ in which, though administrative remedies may have been 
available . . . the prisoner’s failure to comply with administrative 
procedural requirements may nevertheless have been justified.”127  
Shaidon Blake was an inmate who failed to file a grievance after being 
assaulted.128  Due to the ambiguous wording of the inmate grievance 
procedure, Blake believed an investigation into his assault, which found 
the corrections officers in fact used excessive force, meant he was not 
required to file a grievance.129  He proceeded to file a § 1983 claim in 
court.130  The district court dismissed the claim, and the Fourth Circuit—
 
122. See generally Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the 
meaning of “available” remedies in relation to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement).  
123. Id. at 686; see also Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 676 (2d. Cir. 2004) (citing Berry v. 
Kerik, 366 F. 3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2003))  
If the court finds that administrative remedies were available to the plaintiff, and that the defendants 
are not estopped and have not forfeited their non-exhaustion defense, but that the plaintiff 
nevertheless did not exhaust available remedies, the court should consider whether ‘special 
circumstances’ have been plausibly alleged that justify ‘the prisoner’s failure to comply with 
administrative procedural requirements.’  
124. Giano, 380 F.3d at 675. 
125. Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 691. 
126. 787 F.3d 693, 698 (4th Cir. 2015).  
127. See id. (quoting Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 676 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
128. Id. at 695.  Shaidon Blake was assaulted by two guards in a Baltimore prison. The 
guards punched Blake multiple times in the face while Blake was handcuffed. Rachel Poser, Why 
It’s Nearly Impossible for Prisoners to Sue Prisons, THE NEW YORKER (May 30, 2016) 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-its-nearly-impossible-for-prisoners-to-sue-
prisons [https://perma.cc/5S6M-7NFJ].  
129. Blake, 787 F.3d at 698. 
130. Id.  Blake’s complaint fell into two agency review procedures; the Internal 
Investigative Unit (IIU) which investigated prison employee misconduct, and the Administrative 
Remedy Procedure (ARP) which prescribes procedures an inmate must follow to obtain an 
administrative remedy. Id. at 698–701. Blake originally thought the IIU investigation fulfilled his 
administrative remedy obligation which conflicted with the prescribed procedures under ARP. Id.  
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using its newly adopted “special circumstances” exception—
reversed.131  
The Fourth Circuit applied the Second Circuit’s two-part test in 
determining whether to excuse total exhaustion on the grounds of faulty 
or unclear grievance procedures.132  First, the court considered “whether 
‘the prisoner was justified in believing that his complaints in the 
disciplinary appeal procedurally exhausted his administrative remedies 
because the prison’s remedial system was confusing,’ and second, 
‘whether the prisoner’s submissions in the disciplinary appeals process 
exhausted his remedies in a substantive sense by affording corrections 
officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally.’”133  The 
Fourth Circuit determined this inquiry struck the appropriate balance 
between equity to inmates confronted with confusing internal procedures 
who still attempt to exhaust, while simultaneously upholding the goals of 
the exhaustion requirement by preventing “unnecessary and unexpected 
litigation.”134 
The Supreme Court disagreed.  In the Court’s subsequent review, it 
termed such an approach “freewheeling” and “inconsistent with the 
PLRA.”135  Yet the Court did not hold that rejecting a “special 
circumstances” exception necessarily precluded Blake’s suit, “because 
the PLRA contains its own textual exception to mandatory 
exhaustion.”136  Instead, the Court ruled “a prisoner need exhaust only 
‘available’ administrative remedies” and reframed Blake’s argument as a 
“contention that the prison’s grievance process was not in fact available 
to him.”137  The Court further defined availability, reasoning that “an 
inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures 
that are ‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained 
of.’”138  Three situations were immediately identified as fitting into that 
scenario: (1) where an administrative procedure is unavailable because 
 
131. Id. at 698. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. (citing Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
134. Id. 
135. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1855 (2016).  
136. Id. at 1856. 
137. Id. 
138. See id. at 1859 (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737–38 (2001) (considering 
multiple conflicting definitions for “remedies” and “available” following an inmate’s allegations 
of cruel and unusual punishment at the hands of corrections officers)). 
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there is a dead end; (2) where an administrative scheme is “so opaque that 
it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use” or “no ordinary 
prisoner can discern or navigate” it; (3) and finally, where “prison 
administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance 
process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.”139  
Due to numerous inconsistencies and confusion in Maryland’s 
grievance procedures, the Supreme Court found it plausible that Blake 
may not have had “available” remedies, and therefore, his claim may very 
well have been exhausted.140  However, the Fourth Circuit’s finding that 
Blake fit a “special circumstance” exception was reversed.141  Instead, 
the case was remanded for further analysis to determine whether 
Maryland’s unclear grievance procedures rendered administrative 
remedies practically unavailable.142  These cases deciding the meaning 
of the exhaustion requirement work together to form an intricate network 
of judicial rules that prisoners must traverse in order to have a chance at 
their day in court.  
D. The Rules Applied 
Court rulings interpreting the exhaustion requirement work in 
conjunction to make any prison grievance system difficult to navigate, 
and amending the PLRA to require only a good faith initial attempt at 
exhaustion would prevent outcomes like that of Bryant v. Rich.143  
Although Bryant was decided before Ross v. Blake, the Eleventh Circuit 
had not yet adopted a Hemphill analysis and was therefore unaffected by 
the Ross decision.144  
In Bryant, the Court addressed whether the claims of two prisoners, 
Andrew Priester and Gregory Bryant, had been exhausted.145  The court 
held neither had exhausted their administrative remedies.146  The 
analysis of Bryant’s failure to exhaust is particularly enlightening as to 
 
139. Id.   
140. Id. at 1860–61. 
141. Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1854. 
142. Id. 
143. 530 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2008).  
144. Id. at 1371. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 1379. 
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the contortions courts have had to go through in an attempt to uniformly 
apply the PLRA. 
Bryant was subjected to excessive force by corrections officers, 
including being kicked and beaten.147  His filed grievance detailing the 
account was denied.148  Bryant then filed an appeal within five days, 
instead of the mandated four, because he was misinformed as to the time 
frame for filing such grievances, and did not receive an appeal form until 
the fourth day.149  The Court determined this did not count as exhaustion 
because Bryant still could have petitioned for the time limit to be waived 
after his appeal was dismissed as untimely.150    
Bryant was again subjected to excessive force, this time in retaliation 
for filing the initial grievance.151  Out of fear of what would happen if 
he reported the incident, he did not file another grievance before being 
transferred to a separate prison.152  While the court did not fault him for 
not filing a grievance due to his fear of reprisal, it still did not consider 
him to be excused from exhaustion.153  The court noted that he failed to 
file a grievance once transferred, despite the fact that such a grievance 
would be considered untimely.154  In order to have completely 
exhausted, he needed to have “filed an out-of-time grievance and then 
shown good cause for its untimeliness.”155  As he did not do so, “Bryant 
failed to exhaust an administrative remedy that was available to him.”156 
The mental hoops the court jumped through in order to find the claims 
had not been exhausted are, themselves, exhausting to follow.  Up front, 
the court found Bryant had not exhausted his initial claim because his 
appeal was untimely.  It then mandated an untimely grievance in order to 
complete the exhaustion process.  The court seemed to rely on the off 
chance that Bryant could have met a “good cause standard” and found his 
 
147. Id. at 1372. 
148. Id. at 1378. 
149. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1378.  
150. Id. at 1379 (associating prison administration procedure allowing time limit 
requirements to be waived following a good cause showing with full exhaustion of remedies 
required by the PLRA). 
151. Id. at 1372. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 1379. 
154. Id. 
155. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1379. 
156. Id. 
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failure to petition for an extension to the very deadlines outlined in the 
inmate grievance procedures precluded him from being heard in court.157  
But when circuit courts cannot agree on when an inmate has exhausted 
his or her administrative remedies under the PLRA’s requirement,158 
how is an inmate supposed to know?  Literature on this topic has sprouted 
in an attempt to help inmates decipher this critical inquiry, but it can only 
do so much.159   
IV.    ENDEMIC RACISM IN THE PRISON SETTING: 
WHY THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE AMENDED 
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement and the complicated rules 
promulgated both by the courts and prison systems do not exist in a 
vacuum.  Instead, they exist in a country where prisons host endemic 
racism and the majority of inmates are black and Hispanic.  In 2010, the 
Southern Poverty Law Center found that “[i]n at least six states, guards 
have appeared in mock Klan attire in recent years, and guards have been 
accused of race-based threats, beatings and even shootings in 10 
states.”160  In 2015, state officials in Northern California found an 
“entrenched culture” of racism after conducting an investigation of High 
Desert State Prison.161  In interviews with inmates, officials reported that 
 
157. Id. 
158. See e.g., Dillon v. Rogers 596 F.3d 260, 267–68 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding the full 
exhaustion requirement is not excused when an inmate fails to follow grievance procedures at their 
current detention facility for a beating by corrections officers when inmate was being held at a 
previous, temporary facility no longer in existence). Spada v. Martinez, 579 Fed. App’x. 82, 86 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (excusing exhaustion after an administrative remedy was deemed not available as a result 
of prison staff withholding grievance forms from an inmate). At the time of Spada’s grievance 
request, Pennsylvania did not have a provision permitting time limits to be waived following a 
showing of good cause and subsequently did not require Spada to file an untimely grievance in 
order to comply with the full exhaustion requirement of the PLRA. Id. at 86, n.3. The contrast in 
these decisions also points out the lack of consistencies in prisoner grievance procedures which 
also create confusing and differing applications of the PLRA by the circuit courts. 
159. Terri LeClercq, Prison Grievances: When to Write, How to Write (2013).  
160. Allegations of Racist Guards Are Plaguing the Corrections Industry, INTELLIGENCE 
REP., SPLC, Dec. 2000, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-
report/2000/allegations-racist-guards-are-plaguing-corrections-industry [https://perma.cc/UQ9K-
9W4J] (last visited December 30, 2017).  
161. See Paige St. John, State investigators cite culture of abuse, racism by High Desert 
State Prison guards, LA TIMES, http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-pol-abuse-california-
prison-20151216-story.html [https://perma.cc/6XBD-XG96] (last visited December 30, 2017) 
(asserting officers have essentially setup inmates for attack); HIGH DESERT, supra note 20, at 11–
13. 
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“[b]lack inmates wouldn’t get enough time to eat; the officers would 
‘kick’ the blacks out of the chow hall first and then the Hispanics.”162  
Ultimately, the investigation concluded that “[f]rom the casual use of 
derogatory racial terms to de facto discrimination, it became apparent to 
the [Office of the Inspector General] there is a serious issue at [High 
Desert State Prison,] and that the institution’s leadership appears 
oblivious to these problems.”163  
A New York Times article recently uncovered some equally troubling 
statistics.164  It found black and Hispanic inmates were disciplined at 
much higher rates than white inmates.165  Black and Hispanic inmates 
were also kept in solitary confinement more frequently and for longer 
durations.166  This discrepancy was most apparent in prisons with a low 
correlation between the racial composition of the inmate population and 
the racial composition of the custody staff.167  In fact, the article found 
that “[a]t Clinton, a prison near the Canadian border where only one of 
the 998 guards is African American, black inmates were nearly four times 
as likely to be sent to isolation as whites, and they were held there for an 
average of 125 days, compared with 90 days for whites.”168  
The racial disparity in punishments seems to disappear when the racial 
composition of inmates is reflected in the racial composition of the 
guards.169  At Sing Sing Correctional Facility in Ossining, “[b]lack 
officers make up the majority of the uniformed staff . . . ” and according 
to the New York Times “[t]here were no disciplinary disparities between 
whites and blacks at Sing Sing.”170  
After an investigation into the brutal attack of Kevin Moore, an inmate 
at Downstate Correctional Facility who was savagely beaten before 
 
162. HIGH DESERT, supra note 20, at 11.  At High Desert, 76% of custody staff is white, 
contrasting with 79% of inmates who are black or Hispanic. Id. at 12.  
163. Id.   
164. Michael Schwirtz, The Scourge of Racial Bias in New York State’s Prisons, N.Y. 
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/nyregion/new-york-state-prisons-inmates-racial-
bias.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=1 [https://nyti.ms/2jDMoMz] (last visited December 
30, 2017). 
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corrections officers ripped dreadlocks out of his head as keepsakes, the 
United States Attorney prosecuting the case announced “[e]xcessive use 
of force in prisons, we believe, has reached crisis proportions in New 
York State.”171  Investigations and studies clearly show black and 
Hispanic inmates are far more likely to suffer serious violations of their 
constitutional rights in prison,172 and are therefore more seriously 
impacted by the strict exhaustion requirements.  
A.    A Possible Solution 
If excessive force in prisons has reached crisis proportion, how can a 
statute that strictly limits remedies for excessive force in prisons possibly 
be justified?  How many lawsuits from inmates victimized by institutional 
racism in High Desert State Prison, or Clinton, or Downstate Correctional 
were barred from ever being heard on the merits simply because they filed 
a grievance a day late?  How many prisoners, like Erick Marshel, could 
have emerged victorious on his or her claims if not for a procedural 
technicality?  
In light of the issues surrounding the correctional system today, the 
stringent exhaustion requirement of the PLRA should be amended to 
require only an initial good faith attempt at exhaustion, and only if a 
prison’s administrative remedies comply with federal regulations.  This 
solution would allow  
[C]ourts to punish prisoners who seek to deliberately bypass state 
administrative remedies, but [ . . . ] would not impose the draconian 
punishment of procedural default on prisoners who make reasonable, 
good-faith efforts to comply with relevant administrative rules but[,] out 
of fear of retaliation, a reasonable mistake of law, or simple inadvertence, 
make some procedural misstep along the way.173 
 
171. Michael Winerip, Five New York Prison Guards Charged in ‘13 Beating of Inmate, 
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/nyregion/new-york-officers-downstate-
correctional-facility-inmate-beating.html [https://nyti.ms/2lDpSCj] (last visited December 30, 
2017).  
172. Schwirtz, supra note 164; see generally HIGH DESERT, supra note 20 (citing a 2015 
special review of High Desert State Prison in California and finding that several inmates reported 
experiencing overt racism).  
173. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 119 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Stevens posited his own solution in his Woodford dissent.174  He 
suggested “[f]ederal courts simply exercise their discretion to dismiss 
suits brought by the former group of litigants (those seeking to bypass 
administrative remedies) but not those brought by the latter (those 
inmates who have made good faith efforts, but failed to comply with 
administrative procedures).”175  This was the very approach the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement sought to remedy.  The precursor to the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement was the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons 
(CRIPA) “exhaustion of remedies” requirement.176  It allowed the court 
to exercise discretion in requiring exhaustion if it felt “plain, speedy, and 
effective administrative remedies [were] available.”177  This approach 
would cause inequity amongst the districts: areas with substantially more 
prison litigation would be more inclined to dismiss than those less 
burdened by such a problem.   
To prevent inequity, exhaustion should be required uniformly, but only 
where exhaustion remedies are available.  Courts should not require the 
“total exhaustion” or “proper exhaustion” delineated in Woodford.  
Instead, good faith attempts to comply with a grievance procedure should 
be enough, regardless of whether an initial grievance was timely or 
whether deadlines were missed during subsequent appeals.  This would 
encourage prisoners to utilize grievance systems where available and 
simultaneously give prisons notice of deficits in facility conditions.  
CRIPA also did not allow exhaustion to be required unless the 
“Attorney General has certified[,] or the court has determined[,] that such 
administrative remedies are in substantial compliance” with minimum 
standards outlined in subsequent sections of the statute.178  This ensured 
prisoners were not being routed to faulty grievance systems in an effort 
to bypass litigation.  CRIPA’s minimum standard should be adopted as 
part of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.  As it stands now, the only 
recourse available to a prisoner arguing to be excused from the 




176. 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1980) (modified by enforcement of PLRA exhaustion requirement 
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system is to claim that very grievance system was “unavailable” under 
Ross precedent.179  
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement should be amended to require 
only initial, good faith attempts at exhaustion, and only where a prison’s 
administrative procedures meet minimum federal standards.  This middle 
ground provides inmates with access to the court systems as long as they 
attempt to follow inmate grievance procedures.  However, it does not bar 
their claims based on procedural technicalities.  This approach achieves 
the goal of managing inmate complaints without flooding the court 
system with frivolous litigation.  It continues to allow prisons  
opportunities to receive first notice of their deficiencies and to correct 
problems within their institution before proceeding to court.  When 
balancing the burden placed on prisons and courts with a citizen’s ability 
to seek redress, a citizen’s basic human rights and access to the courts 
must be given considerable weight. 
V.    CONCLUSION 
In light of the issues currently facing the prison system, including 
endemic racism and excessive force from corrections officers, the 
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, as it is currently enforced, is too strict.  
Current Supreme Court precedent mandates “proper exhaustion,” which 
is too high a bar for prisoners to meet.  Proper exhaustion requires a 
prisoner to fully comply with a prison’s grievance system—a system 
which varies from state to state and currently has no federal oversight—
before the prisoner files suit in court.180  Failure to do so can cause the 
prisoner’s lawsuit to be dismissed.181  This grueling standard does 
nothing to account for the complexity of a state’s particular grievance 
system or an inmate’s misunderstanding of  grievance procedures.  It is a 
unilateral bar that does not give judges the discretion to excuse a failure 
to exhaust, or to allow meritorious claims to proceed through the judicial 
process. 
The PLRA should be amended to ease the burden on prisoners by 
requiring only a good faith initial attempt at exhaustion, and only where 
a prison’s grievance procedures meet minimum federal standards.  This 
 
179. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1860–61 (2016). 
180. Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 97 (2d. Cir. 2000) rev’d, 534 U.S. 516 (2002). 
181. Id. 
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solution places more discretion in the hands of the judiciary and achieves 
the PLRA’s goals without denying prisoners access to courts for merely 
missing a deadline.  With such an amendment, prisoners would be 
required to at least attempt to put prisons on notice as to detrimental 
conditions, but they would not be barred from pursuing claims for failing 
to do so in light of faulty or confusing grievance procedures.  By 
including this good faith amendment, the PLRA can work towards 
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